Securing autonomous AI agents: agent identity and permissions, guardrails on tool use, runtime protection, and discovering which agents an organization runs.
MarketingProductR&D
AI security posture management
Inventory of AI models, apps and data flows; misconfiguration and risk scoring; AI governance and compliance (EU AI Act, ISO 42001, NIST AI RMF).
ProductMarketing
Funding, acquisitions and partnerships
Funding rounds, acquisitions, strategic partnerships, cloud-marketplace listings, and major customer announcements.
MarketingProduct
MCP and tool-integration security
Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers, agent tool and plugin integrations, and how vendors scan, gateway, or secure them.
ProductR&D
Positioning and category claims
New taglines, category names a vendor is trying to own, comparative claims against competitors, analyst recognition, and pricing or packaging changes.
Marketing
Prompt injection and jailbreak research
New attack techniques, red-teaming results, vulnerability disclosures, and detection approaches for prompt injection and jailbreaks.
Zenity published a blog post describing a five-level maturity model (HAMMER) for securing homegrown AI agent development, emphasizing that security must be embedded in design, testing, and release pipelines rather than added late.
“Secure AI agent development is the area where the homegrown, code-first distinction matters most. When an organization buys a SaaS agent, the vendor owns the build, the guardrails, and the release pipeline. When an organization builds its own, every one of those belongs to the organization”Quoted from the original
R&D
Zenity highlights threat-modeling for agents, MCP vetting, guardrail standardization, AI-SBOM inventory, and runtime red-teaming as technical security practices, plus protecting configuration from agent self-modification.
Zenity Labs disclosed AgentCorruption, a chain of security flaws in Amazon Bedrock AgentCore that allowed attackers to compromise all agents in an AWS account and region through a single prompt to a public-facing agent.
“Using a single prompt to one public-facing agent, researchers took over all AgentCore agents within the same AWS account and region, accessed private conversations and cloud credentials and persistently manipulated agent behavior”Quoted from the original
R&D
The attack exploited IMDS credential retrieval, overprivileged IAM roles shared across agents, internal agent enumeration APIs, and memory manipulation for persistence; IMDSv2 and reduced role permissions are necessary mitigations.